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Abstract 
 
Within the perspective of postcolonial state building in Africa, the study hinges on 
the colonial education, manpower and development nexus to examine the state of 
preparedness of the Trust Territory of the British Southern Cameroons with regards 
to an indigenous political and economic leadership as the British and Nigerian 
colonial authorities were leaving the territory. It discusses the quantity and quality of 
manpower produced by the British colonial education system that was on hand to 
take over the mantle of leadership as the territory gained independence. The study 
asserts that, the forming West Cameroon state was ill-disposed to its own 
endeavours due to lacks in a sufficiently qualified personnel and could thus not 
implement its own policies; the roots being a poorly developed colonial educational 
system. This had significant effects on the socio-economic development of the 
federal state of West Cameroon. The paper has relied on archival data and some 
critical secondary literature to present the argument. 
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Resumen 
Dentro de la perspectiva de la construcción estatal postcolonial en África, el estudio 
gira en torno al vínculo entre la educación colonial, la mano de obra y el desarrollo 
con el objetivo de examinar el grado de preparación del Trust Territory of the 
British Southern Cameroons en relación a un liderazgo político y económico 
indígena mientras que las autoridades coloniales británicas y nigerianas 
abandonaban el territorio. Se analiza la cantidad y la calidad de la mano de obra 
producida por el sistema de educación colonial británico que asumió el mando del 
liderazgo en la medida que el territorio obtuvo la independencia. El estudio afirma 
que el estado de Camerún Occidental no estaba predispuesto a realizar sus propios 
esfuerzos debido a la falta de personal suficientemente calificado y, por lo tanto, no 
podía implementar sus propias políticas. Las raíces del problema, un sistema 
educativo colonial poco desarrollado. Esto tuvo efectos significativos en el 
desarrollo socioeconómico del estado federal del oeste de Camerún. El artículo se ha 
fundamentado en datos de archivo y en algunas publicaciones secundarias críticas. 
___________________________________________________________ 
Palabras clave: Gran Bretaña, educación colonial, Camerún, liderazgo político y 
económico, mano de obra.
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ritain took over the administration of the territory she named 
Southern Cameroons in 1916 following a French and British 
partition of the former German Kamerun. She administered the 
territory as part of her colony of Nigeria until it gained 
independence in 1961 through a federation with the former French 
administered Cameroon (independent since 1 January, 1960 as Republique 
du Cameroun). Historical evidence shows that as of 1961, the territory was 
the least developed of all former British West African dependencies (Aka 
2002; Ndongko, 1981). The evidence also reveals that in the years of the 
federation with former French Cameroons (1961-1972), the former British 
administered section of Cameroon didn’t fare well in terms of local 
administration and socio-economic development (Ndongko, 1981). There 
have also been crucial complaints of the marginalization of the former 
British sector of the country since the days of the federation which have 
even led to the emergence of secessionist tendencies in that part of the 
country (Kum, 2017; Mbaku, 2004; Ndue, 2002; Ngoh, 1999; Koning and 
Nyamnjoh, 1997). While several postulations have been made regarding the 
sources of the region’s underdevelopment and other woes (Ndi, 2013; 
Ngomba, 2004; Ngoh, 2011, 1999; Mbile, 1999) colonial education 
provision has hardly been considered as one of the factors.  
In this paper, I argue that the quality and quantity of British colonial 
educational provision for the Southern Cameroons were key determinants of 
the quality of the political and economic leadership that took the territory 
through the independence negotiations (1959-1961) and administered what 
became the State of West Cameroon in the years of the federation with La 
Republique du Cameroun. I hold that “the establishment of secondary and 
higher education institutions was fundamental in the production of men and 
women who had the standard of public service and the capacity for 
leadership which the progress to self-government demanded” (Adams 1953, 
p.716).  This was particularly the case between 1959 and the end of the 
federation in 1972 when the administration, development and wellbeing of 
this part of Cameroon depended exclusively on the indigenes of the former 
Southern Cameroons whose leadership potentials were also a factor of 
British colonial education provision. 
B 
144   Ndille – Black men, english suits and a corner office 
 
 
As early as 1925 the Mandate Commission of the League of Nations had 
insisted that Britain should supply soundly educated Cameroonians within 
all professional fields (File Ba/1925/5, p.45 NAB). In 1946, the Trusteeship 
Council reiterated the urgency for Britain to “afford qualified Cameroonians 
the opportunity of receiving higher general and advanced professional 
education to the full extent compatible with the interests of the Southern 
Cameroons population” (Trusteeship Council 1947, p.699). Britain, on her 
part acknowledged the importance of setting up “institutions in her colonies, 
some of which should reach university rank and include in their curriculum 
branches of professional or vocational training” (Colonial Office 1925, p.5). 
In the post-World War II years her educational policy for the Cameroons 
categorically stated the need to streamline education in order to develop an 
indigenous/African political and economic leadership to whom the mantle of 
power was to be handed. This was made clear in Article X of the Trusteeship 
Agreement (Tazifor 2003, p.166). These policy directives were reflected 
both the Eastern Nigerian 1953 policy of education and the Southern 
Cameroons educational plan of 1955 (Eastern Region of Nigeria 1953, p.6; 
Southern Cameroons 1955, p.15). The aim was “to ensure a smooth socio-
economic take-off” of former colonies (Ghedo, 1973, p.71; Kindleberger and 
Herrick 1977, pp.1, 5). 
 
Educational Attainment in the Southern Cameroons (1916-1961) 
 
Two key issues determined British colonial education policy and the 
production of a Southern Cameroons educated elite between 1916 and 1961. 
First was the state of willingness of Britain as administering authority to 
relinquish her hold on the Cameroons in the interwar years (1919-1939). 
Here, literature has suggested that by 1939, Britain harboured little or no 
plans (MacOjong, 2008; Ngoh, 1987). Second, and closely linked to the 
first, was the adoption of the approach of filling government positions with 
educated people from her other West African territories (Nfi, 2014; Mukete, 
2013). These two issues downplayed the urgency of an elaborate educational 
system and the production of an educated elite beyond secondary level on 
whom the mantle of leadership was to rest after independence. 
Under Britain, primary education policy in the Cameroons was 
characterised by the philosophy of “adapting education to the needs of the 
local communities” (Colonial Office 1925, pp.3, 5, 7). The philosophy 
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classified the Southern Cameroons as an entirely rural territory and provided 
for a four years junior primary school system (File Ba/1926/3 NAB, p.147; 
Hussey, 1931). As late as 1954, the school system in the Cameroons 
continued to be defined by the 1947 Memorandum on Educational Policy in 
Nigeria, Sessional Paper No.20 of 1947 which amongst other things 
continued to provide “a four-year junior primary school course for all 
children who want it, and a further four-year Senior Primary school course 
for those who can benefit from it” (Cameroons 1954, p.105). The four-year 
junior rural school was uncertificated and emphasized agriculture and 
handicraft “leaving a majority of Southern Cameroonian children to go the 
way of their ancestors” (File Sb/a/1958/4 NAB, p.1) as it provided them 
only with basic skills to sustain them in the rural community.  
By making junior and senior primary education access a matter of want 
and desire on the one hand, and ability and possibility on the other 
respectively, Britain created a pyramidal structure of education in the 
Cameroons in which, very few pupils reached the eighth year of primary 
education to either enter secondary school or get certificated for employment 
purposes. In 1954 primary school enrolment in the Southern Cameroons 
stood at 37,307 pupils. Of this number only 1753 (04.7%) was in Standard 
VI; the eighth and final year of primary school. That year there were 319 
primary schools in the territory with only eight offering the senior primary 
classes where pupils could take the First School Leaving Certificate (FSLC) 
and progress to secondary school (Cameroons 1954, p.113). The level of 
educational wastage was evaluated at 42.3%; the highest in British West 
Africa (Aka 2002, p.148).   
Regarding secondary education, the 1939 Annual Report indicated that 
“there were no facilities for secondary education in the Cameroons 
Province…. Pupils who wished to continue their education beyond Standard 
VI had to do so at Umuahia College or at one of the Mission Colleges in 
Nigeria” (File Ba/a/1939/6 NAB, p.100). Despite many horrendous 
experiences that Southern Cameroon students faced to acquire secondary 
education in Nigeria (Ndille, 2018, pp 32-47) government policy for 
secondary education in the Cameroons remained, “to give an opportunity for 
the able child to proceed from a primary school to a secondary school, and 
thence to a training institution or other institution for post-secondary studies 
in Nigeria” (File Sb/a/1956/4 NAB, p.39; File Sb/a/1958/2 NAB, p.87). This 
was to be achieved in one of two ways; first, through a system of 
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government scholarships and second, parents financing those who desired it 
but could not win government scholarships. While many parents found it 
difficult to shoulder such responsibilities for secondary education for their 
children in far-away Nigeria, the colonial government in terms of the 
number of scholarships, awarded a maximum of three each year (Mbile, 
1999, pp 8-17). This could be termed a negligible contribution.  
By 1961, four secondary schools had been established in the territory by 
missionary bodies; Saint Joseph’s College, Sasse-Buea in 1939; the Basel 
Mission College-Bali in 1949 the Queen of the Rosary College Okoyong in 
1955 and the Sacred Heart College-Mankon in 1961, offering general 
secondary education. But these efforts were also insignificant in the 
production of an educated elite for the territory. This is because the colonial 
administration insisted that the schools must shoulder school funding 
responsibilities and be strict on admission age requirements (File 
Sb/a/1956/6 NAB). The schools were only allowed to recruit 36 students per 
stream each year (File Sb/a/1958/2 NAB) with the consequence that, as of 
1954, the Trusteeship Council expressed dissatisfaction at the level of 
secondary education provision in the Cameroons (Trusteeship Council Doc. 
T/1147 Addendum 1, 1954; Trusteeship Council 1955, p.897). While Britain 
recognized that there were “always a considerable number of applicants for 
admission to secondary schools” she argued that the problem lay in 
obtaining “the right type, young enough…and many of the applicants were 
below the standard academically” (Cameroons 1954, p.115). This 
assessment was based on entrance examinations and age requirements which 
many complained hindered access but which the colonial authorities 
continued to adhere to despite the call to improve this sector (File Ba/1949/4 
NAB). 
In 1961, the year of independence, the four mission secondary schools in 
the territory put together had a total enrolment of only 882 students. This 
enrolment represented a dismal 0.75% of all primary schools in the territory 
which stood at 116,859 pupils (Burns 1965, p72; West Cameroon 1962, 
pp.16, 19). The facilities at the four Mission schools remained thus under-
utilized as many prospective Southern Cameroons children continued to be 
rejected through stringent admission regulations. Even when members of the 
Southern Cameroons Provincial Education Committee argued that it was 
“impracticable to insist upon ideal admission age of twelve or thirteen” and 
very difficult entrance examinations, the government insisted that “a balance 
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had to be maintained between the territory’s urgent need for educated people 
and the equally vital necessity to maintain standards” (File No. Sb/a/1958/2, 
NAB).  
Apart from the low output in the few Mission secondary schools, the 
unwillingness of the colonial government to set up government secondary 
schools in the territory as they had done in Nigeria further exacerbated 
manpower development. In 1954 there were 82 secondary schools in the 
Eastern Region of Nigeria within which Southern Cameroons had been 
administered. Of this number 23 were government owned (Nduka 1964, 
p.147) but none of these were in the Cameroons. While the administering 
authority insisted that it was “continuing to make facilities for secondary 
education in Nigeria accessible to Southern Cameroonians without 
discrimination” (Cameroons 1955, p.81) it was evident that the system of 
quotas and scholarships through which a maximum of three Southern 
Cameroonians could enter such institutions each year did not permit the 
territory meet its secondary education needs through Nigeria. By limiting the 
expansion of secondary education, Britain therefore limited the development 
of educated manpower beyond elementary levels.   
Regarding higher education, its development in the British African 
dependencies “was necessitated by the need to produce men and women 
who would have the standard of public service and the capacity for 
leadership which the progress of self-government demanded” (Adams 1953, 
p.716). This meant that, Britain, as administering authority, owed the people 
of Southern Cameroons a sustainable system of higher education. As 
mentioned above, as early as 1923, the Mandate Commission had requested 
her to make available an elaborate plan in this direction. This was re-iterated 
by the Trusteeship Council. The absence of a secondary education institution 
in the Mandate period, greatly limited any possibility for a reasonable 
number of Southern Cameroonians to acquire post-secondary education at 
that time.  
After the Second World War however, with the creation of the United 
Nations Trusteeship Council (UN-TC) special emphasis was placed on the 
development of Higher education in most Trust Territories.  Britain’s 
arrangement for university studies was for candidates from the British 
administered Cameroons to enter the University College Ibadan-Nigeria 
through a system of scholarships (Cameroons 1947, p.150). Again, like 
secondary education, the system of providing higher education to Southern 
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Cameroonians in Nigeria proved unsatisfactory in meeting higher education 
needs for the territory. In 1949, there were 800 applications for government 
university scholarships in Nigeria and only 115 were awarded of which only 
03 (0.02%) of the awards were attributed to the Trust Territory of Northern 
and Southern Cameroons put together (Cameroons 1949, p.80). As of 1947, 
only four students from the Cameroons were reported to be studying in 
universities in the United Kingdom and elsewhere (Cameroons 1947, p.150).   
In 1948 UNESCO ordered a study of the “possibility of establishing and 
maintaining a university to meet the higher education needs of the 
inhabitants of Trust Territories in Africa by the year 1952” (Trusteeship 
Council Doc. T/334 1949, pp.1-3). Unfortunately, Britain and France who 
administered most of the trust territories argued against the scheme; their 
reason being that “… only a minority of secondary school children in these 
territories are of the temperament suited for a university education” 
(Trusteeship Council 1949 Doc. T/369, p.2) This would have provided 
greater access to higher education for the territory considering the fact that 
the Southern Cameroons, with its central location vis-à-vis the other five 
trust territories, stood a greater chance of hosting the university (Trusteeship 
Council 1949 Doc. T/369, p.2).  
The consequence of the poor higher education policy for the Cameroons 
was that in 1959, only 116 Southern Cameroonians had been registered in 
higher education institutions in Nigeria and abroad since 1954 (File 
Sb/a/1958/1 NAB).  In 1961, the year Southern Cameroons gained 
independence, there were not more than twenty university graduates in the 
territory (Phillipson, 1959; West Cameroon, 1962, p.16). That year, there 
were only 21 Southern Cameroonians holding executive posts (File 
Sb/a/1959/11 NAB) and the number of students pursuing higher education 
outside the territory was 65 compared to 6800 Nigerians, 280 Gambians, 
3,793 Ghanaians and 833 Sierra Leoneans (British Council, 1961). This was 
not unconnected to Britain’s colonial education policy in the Cameroons. 
There were 65 Southern Cameroonians in British universities in 1961 with 
only ten taking degree courses. There were 17 others in Nigeria pursuing 
various degree and professional courses (Federation of Nigeria, 1960,p.1, 
16). These figures revealed that there would be a huge man power 
inadequacy at top levels of administration which was bound to negatively 
affect the rate of ‘Cameroonization’ of the public service at independence 
(Trusteeship Council Doc T/1426, 1959). 
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Independence, Challenges and Strategies for the Cameroonization of the 
Administration 
 
I have mentioned above that Britain’s policy of administering the 
Cameroons as an appendage of Nigeria (File Ba/1923/1, NAB) led to two 
policy recommendations which despite their being disadvantageous to the 
Cameroons were upheld by Britain throughout the mandate and trusteeship. 
First, apart from the Missions’ efforts, Britain maintained her policy of 
providing post-primary public education for Southern Cameroonians in 
Nigerian institutions. Second, she upheld the policy of recruiting Nigerians 
to work in the Cameroons. While the first policy limited the production of an 
indigenous educated manpower beyond the primary school level, the second 
removed the urgency of an indigenous educated manpower which would 
have signalled the need for an elaborate post-primary education system in 
the Cameroons.  
By 1944, of a total of 163 public service staff in the Southern Cameroons, 
130 were Nigerians and only 33 were Southern Cameroonians (Cameroon 
Youth League, 1944, p.5). In 1946, all the four head teachers of the 
government primary schools in Southern Cameroons were Nigerians (File 
Sb/e/1950/1 NAB). By 1959 there were 1471 posts in the Southern 
Cameroons public service with 121 in the Senior Administrative category 
and 63 in the executive Category all of which required a post-primary 
certificate as entry requirement (File Oc/1961/1 NAB). Of this number, only 
36 Southern Cameroonians were in the two categories put together. 52 posts 
were vacant and 70 were occupied by Europeans and Nigerians (File 
Oa/1960/2, p.9 NAB). These figures highlighted the critical need for 
indigenous public service personnel educated beyond the primary school and 
made people to fear that if the Southern Cameroons seceded from Nigeria, 
and if, as a result, British and Nigerian manpower were to leave the territory, 
some state departments would collapse (Phillipson, 1959, p.10).  
Southern Cameroons got independence in 1961 by reunifying with the 
former French Cameroons on a federated state basis amidst Britain’s 
expectations of integration into Nigeria.  It then became the state of West 
Cameroon but adopted the Nigerian Civil Service Code made up of four 
levels each spanning considerable grades depending on experience and 
training. These levels included the senior, intermediate, junior services and 
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daily paid workers. Except in the case of daily paid workers whose only 
qualification was physical fitness, a degree from a recognized university was 
accepted for entry into the senior service; a diploma into the intermediate 
service while a secondary school certificate gave access into the junior 
service (File Oc/1961/1 NAB). Primary school leavers were also qualified 
for employment as clerks but at a lower grade and salary. A civil servant 
could rise in grade and category with several years of demonstrated 
competence but in principle, qualifications remained paramount (File 
Ob/f/1953/2 NAB). 
Independence led to two developments which put the government at the 
end of its tether. First, new administrative units were created which required 
a huge number of highly educated indigenes as service heads and senior civil 
servants (Federal Republic of Cameroon, 1961a). Second, there was a mass 
departure of British and Nigerian expatriates. These developments not only 
exposed the futility of a poorly developed British colonial educational 
system in the Southern Cameroons; with a majority of indigenes holding 
primary school and elementary teacher training certificates and very few 
holding secondary education and university qualifications, but showed how 
desperate the government was in the face of such a critical shortage of 
people with the right kind of education and experience. As a strategy, the 
state government began filling senior administrative positions only by 
promoting first class clerks, some with a limited secondary education but a 
majority with primary school certificates (File Od/a/1961/1 NAB). As this 
measure was far from being palliative, the government went on to 
compromise quality further by waiving the civil service code of 
appointments entirely. From then, recruitments and appointments followed 
no laid down criteria. 
 It became common to find primary school teachers with not more than 
12 to 13 years of formal education being appointed to executive positions. 
West Cameroonians who passed the London General Certificate of 
Education in two subjects at the advanced level were employed as Assistant 
Executive Officers. By the civil service code, such persons were best suited 
for clerical positions (File Oc/1961/1 NAB; Cameroon Champion 5 
December 1961, pp.1, 3). Similarly, high school students or anyone who 
passed the same examination either in three subjects in one sitting or in four 
subjects in two sittings, was appointed into the senior grade of the civil 
service. One could find a few permanent secretaries in the ministries who 
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were responsible for providing technical advice to the government with 
undergraduate diplomas but the majority were at best primary and secondary 
school leavers a situation which was described as alarming (Cameroon 
Champion, 5 December 1961, p.1).  
On the whole, the need to get people fill civil service positions was 
abused in West Cameroon due to the absence of qualified indigenes. One of 
the most striking examples was that of the Attorney General who was not 
more than 30 years old and had less than five years of practical experience. 
Following the Civil Service Code, he would have been no more than a pupil 
lawyer at the time he became the Attorney General of the Southern 
Cameroons (Aka, 2002, p.202). Some holders of Elementary Teacher Grade 
II Certificates were recruited as District Officers (D.O) and Assistant District 
Officers (A.D.O) (Cameroon Champion, 5 December 1961, p.5). While the 
phenomenon drew bitter criticisms from some members of the public (Aka 
2002, p.149) it was evident that an underdeveloped colonial education 
system had given people the leverage to man government departments for 
which they had very little knowledge, training or experience. The effects 
were to be felt in the political decision making processes and the economic 
performance of the state. 
 
The ‘Cameroonized’ Leadership and the Economic Performance of 
West Cameroon 
 
Although the 1961 constitutional provisions left the general guidance of the 
economy and development planning exclusively with federal jurisdiction, 
the states, under certain provisions, were permitted to work in these fields 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, 1961b, Part II Articles 
5.7 and 7.1). The West Cameroon government therefore targeted 
industrialization especially agro-industry as its policy priority (Ngomba 
2004, p.100). To achieve this goal, it created the West Cameroon 
Development Agency (WCDA) in 1962. It was to succeed the Southern 
Cameroons Development Agency (SCDA) which had been established in 
1956. The WCDA made relentless efforts in fostering the economic 
development of West Cameroon by initiating, acquiring and becoming a 
partner in several development projects. Table 2 below presents the major 
WCDA investments.  
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Table 2  
WCDA Investment Projects 1959-1972 
 Project Value (FCFA) Life Span 
1 Cameroon Fisheries Limited 11. 070.000 1959-1962 
2 Cameroon Bank 69.200.000 1961-1972 
3 Cameroon Air Transport 6.920.000 1961-1962 
4 Cameroon Commercial Corporation  37.500.000 1963-1964 
5 United Cameroon Trading Company 27.680.000 1962-1964 
6 Buea Mountain Hotel 20.760.000 1962-1963 
7 Cameroon Rethreading Industry 8.250.000 1965-1966 
8 Tiko Iron Works 40.000.000 1962-1964 
9 Kamerun Timber LTD 10.380.000 1959-1960 
10  Coastal Timber( Cameroon) LTD 3.460.000 1959-1960 
11 Cameroon Forest Products LTD 3.460.000 1959-1960 
Source: Dervish, 1968, p.178 
Despite the strenuous efforts to revamp the economy through the above 
mentioned projects, the attainment of WCDA objectives left a lot to be 
desired. Most of the projects ran into difficulties within the first few years of 
their inception. The Cameroon Fisheries Project failed from inception while 
the Cameroon Timber Company in which the WCDA had 15000 ordinary 
shares went into liquidation in 1962. By April 1964, barely two years after it 
went operational, the Tiko Iron Works which produced steel pots had 
collapsed. Further efforts in 1965 such as the Motor Tyre Rethreading 
Industry; the Cameroon Commercial Corporation Ltd and Cameroon 
Building Society aimed at revamping the economy were all grounded by 
1968. By the late 1960s, the Cameroon Air Transport Ltd, the United 
Cameroon Transport Agency and the Cameroon Bank Ltd were all in serious 
difficulties (Dervish, 1968, pp. 17-19). By 1970, none of the remaining 
projects was making a profit and the majority had in fact failed. In the words 
of Ngomba, (2004, p.96) “the economic woes of West Cameroon termed 
underdevelopment were aggravated by the short comings of the WCDA.”  
Some sources chide the West Cameroon government for appointing top 
rank managers on the basis of party affiliations and compensation. They 
argue that, ‘it did not seem to matter if any project failed or succeeded so 
long as a board member retained the confidence of the ruling party 
(Cameroon Express 9 July, 1968, pp.3, 7). While such sources hold firm to 
the ‘greed and nepotism’ theory of the West Cameroon government officials, 
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a major dynamic in the economic woes of the West Cameroon government 
which has not received significant attention is the appointment of people into 
the top ranks of administration without due regard for educational 
qualifications and training. For example, the WCDA chairman, W.P. Lebaga 
was one of the founding fathers of the KNDP but had not succeeded to enter 
parliament on any of the occasions; 1954, 1957 and 1959. The party 
hierarchy may have decided to reward his political faithfulness with such an 
appointment. His poor performance as board chairperson however may have 
been more a factor of his education and training than his innate motivations 
to be corrupt to the point of crippling the Agency. His highest qualification 
was a Grade II teacher certificate and experience as a supervising head 
teacher (Dervish, 1968, p.13). The Commission of Inquiry set up to 
investigate the poor performance of the WCDA acknowledged the fact that 
professionalism had been neglected in leadership choice due to the 
unavailability of people with the right kind of education. The Commission 
noted that: 
 
Incompetence…absence of a reasonable level of academic 
training,…the extremely low calibre of  many persons appointed to 
the WCDA Board…some of whom could not write their names… and 
could not participate intelligently in Board deliberations…’ was the 
most important reason for the collapse of WCDA (Dervish, 1968, 
p.19).  
 
Table 3  
Academic Qualifications of the WCDA Administrative Personnel as of 1968 
 Position  Academic Qualification 
1 Secretary/Accounta
nt 
 West African School Certificate (GCE 
O/L) 
2 Executive officer  Standard VI First School Leaving 
Certificate 
3 Confidential 
Secretary 
 Standard IV education 
4 Assistant executive 
officer 
 Standard IV education 
 Teachers Grade III Certificate 
5 Manager Santa 
Coffee 
 Cambridge Overseas Schools 
Certificate. 
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6 Mechanical 
Superintendent 
 GCE Ordinary level Certificate 
 Further Training in the UK (1968) 
7 Saw Mill Manager  Standard IV 
 Government Technical College Ombe 
Source: Dervish, 1968. Report of the Commission of Inquiry. P. 178. 
Table 3 above shows an example of the mismatch between educational 
qualifications and professionalism which the Dervish Commission reports 
above. It also shows that with the collapse of WCDA projects manned by 
people with basic education, developmentally oriented projects had to  
possess strong administrative, regulatory, technical and extractive capacities 
for strategic policy formulation, implementation, evaluation and correction 
in a timely manner with minimum sloppage (Gyimah-Boadi 2004, p.4). For 
this to be achieved, the educational system must have been elaborately 
established to churn out administrators, managers, economists, strategists 
and other top level public servants (Aladegbola and Jaiyeola 2016, p.147).   
In West Cameroon the colonial educational system rendered this a luxury, 
sacrificing the development of the state. Apart from Mr. Lebaga’s enormous 
influence within the party he had little or no other training in management to 
become the chairman of the country’s development agency.  
The same could be said of other top managers in the state. For many 
years the Cameroon Bank was managed by inexperienced and incompetent 
staff. As of 1968, the Managing Director, like the Attorney General of West 
Cameroon, was not more than 30 years old and had less than 5 years’ 
experience. By civil service regulations, he was not qualified as a Branch 
Manager, a position which, in West Cameroon, was held by secondary 
school leavers, many of whom ended up in prison largely for lack of 
experience and qualification (Aka 2002, p.148). At the Cameroon Bank, 
there was no standard lending policy. Loans and overdrafts were granted to 
mostly senior government officials with recklessness leading to 
1,154,654,360 Francs CFA in outstanding debts as of 30 June 1965; barely a 
few years into the Bank’s existence (West Cameroon, 1966, pp 53, 203). The 
West Cameroon government in another financial miscalculation withdrew its 
deposit of 700.000.000 Francs CFA in June 1965 in violation of its 1963 
agreement with the Bank (Cameroon Times March 1, 1966, p.4). According 
to the Cameroon Times the money was used to sustain the failing projects of 
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the West Cameroon Development Agency. Such financial miscalculations 
could have been avoided if a well trained and experienced banker/accountant 
was recruited at the head of the Bank on a competitive basis. 
 
Education and the Performance of the West Cameroon Leadership: A 
political Dimension 
 
The federal system of government was abolished in Cameroon 1972 
following a 20th of May referendum. One of the justifications was the poor 
performance of the West Cameroon state government evidenced in part by 
its financial insolvency. Generally, while the West Cameroon delegation had 
gone to the constitutional talks of 1961 with the hope of establishing a loose 
federation or confederation which would have given the state a significant 
degree of powers, the delegation of La Republique du Cameroon could only 
concede to a federation which still ended up giving a lot of powers to the 
federal institutions and the president of the republic. From the close of the 
conference therefore, it was the feeling amongst West Cameroonians that 
their delegation had failed to obtain for the state a significant degree of 
concessions and events began to prove that as far as the union was 
concerned, they were on a disadvantage (Ngoh, 2011, 1999; Aka 2002; 
Mbile 1999). 
While some sources have talked of the British and French conspiracy to 
stifle the West Cameroon leadership (Ndi, 2013, p.71) the absence of 
Secondary and higher education which comes with relevant political 
education cannot be minimised. In fact, Because of the scarcity of 
opportunities for secondary and higher education, the top leadership of West 
Cameroon was drawn from the elementary teacher training corps with a 
curriculum similar to that of primary schools. This compared to general 
secondary and higher education had very limited notions of political 
education and its benefits and hardly met the needs of a sound political 
leadership. This lack accounted for several false starts in the independence 
and reunification negotiations and in the general comportment of the West 
Cameroons political leadership thereafter. 
Empirical research has shown that advanced education affords aspiring 
politicians the competence of grasping complex socio-political, economic 
and cultural concepts which place the beneficiary at an advantage to those 
who do not acquire such an education. Meyers (2011) as well as Hillygus 
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(2005) have found out that higher educational attainment especially of a 
social science nature inspires the cultivation of interest in politics by 
developing cognitive skills and knowledge relevant to politics such as 
negotiation, mediation, and leadership. It also inculcates in the beneficiaries, 
relevant civic skills that facilitate rational engagement for the common good 
and promotes social advancement into politically oriented networks that 
encourage participation and enhance benefits derived from political social 
capital in individuals’ networks.  
The studies on education and political engagement largely converge on 
the fact that “advanced education is the strongest predictor of high positive 
outputs in political participation even when other socio-economic factors are 
considered” (Hillygus, 2005, p.25). Apart from giving learners knowledge, 
and bringing them closer to high political networks, higher education, 
especially with the teaching of social sciences like history, political science, 
public administration and philosophy opens up windows to the 
understanding of the past and present contexts of world affairs. It equips 
students with the necessary theories, practical case studies as well as heroes 
and heroines whose lives and documented experiences could be very 
instructive to future leaders and place them at a higher pedestal of operation 
and performance than those who have not attained such levels. From a 
psychological point of view, higher levels of education also afford the 
beneficiary a personal image void of inferiority complexes in the face of 
political adversaries (Hillygus, 2005, p.26). Brief, those who pass through 
such a system become better prepared for political office than those who 
have little or no knowledge of it.  
This, in no way downplays personal leadership attributes and charisma 
but justifies the fact that, in relation to the leadership in the Southern 
Cameroons and its challenging options of independence (either integrating 
with Nigeria or reunifying with former French Cameroons) the level of 
political maturity, political manoeuvring and negotiation capacity would 
have yielded more fruits for the people if the leadership had been better 
prepared by a complete colonial educational system which included access 
to higher education for a majority of those who qualified for it. 
Consequently, as Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Berry (1996) have argued, their 
ability in understanding the abstract subject of politics, researching and 
evaluating issues at stake rationally and handling the bureaucratic 
requirements effectively was limited due to their level of educational 
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attainment. Apart from that, because the critical issues affecting levels of 
political participation such as social and political networks as well as 
relevant political information which are easily acquired amongst well-
educated and connected individuals (Galton, 2001) were limited or not 
exploited, the performance of the West Cameroon leadership was hampered. 
One of the most popular areas of contention in the history of Cameroon is 
the negotiations for British Southern Cameroons independence which 
culminated in the Foumban Constitutional Conference of 17-21 July 1961 
with the former French administered Cameroons (La Republique du 
Cameroun). Achangkeng argues that these talks qualify as false negotiations 
as the delegation from La Republic du Cameroon strove to gain more by 
stalling the negotiations and avoiding agreement or without an intention of 
reaching one (2014, p.129).  Should this be accepted, it could only be seen as 
a political strategy which was not noticed by the Southern Cameroons 
leadership. Apart from that, he adds that, the lesson of political negotiation 
which teaches that there is need to spend much time and effort in the pre-
negotiation period before a decision is made had not also been learnt by the 
Southern Cameroons leadership (Achangkeng, 2014, p.129).  
Because the Southern Cameroons delegation was ignorant of the 
importance of pre-negotiation, very minimal pre-Foumban conference 
groundwork was carried out. All calls by the British administering authority 
for the government ‘to make constitutional proposals of La Republique du 
Cameroon known to the electorate prior to the plebiscite just like the 
integrationists had done with Nigeria were not heeded (Ngoh, 2011, p.31). 
The few meetings between the Southern Cameroons leadership and La 
Republique du Cameroon bore no fruit other than a few declarations which 
gave the impression that actual constitutional ground works would be 
undertaken after the plebiscite. They registered a false start by allowing 
themselves to be cajoled into voting for the political future of the territory 
(11 February 1961 plebiscite) before deciding on the form and structure of 
the envisaged union (17 July Foumban Conference); a kind of putting the 
cart before the horse.  
Apart from the above, an understanding of basic political ideologies such 
as leadership for the common-good, human needs and structural theories 
would have prevented the Southern Cameroons delegation from engaging 
discussions without involving all sheds of opinion (Aka, 2002; Mbile, 1999). 
The Southern Cameroons Leadership failed to understand the degree of 
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moral commitment that a leader makes to his people as well as the 
seriousness and consequences of failing to meet that commitment. They also 
did not understand the difficulties which the drawing of a constitution 
entailed. They did not understand that the constitution was not a partisan 
affair, but a national issue and that it had, therefore, to represent all shades of 
political opinion if it was to serve the interests of the people as a whole. This 
was particularly so for a constitution which was to unite two territories of 
different colonial and cultural backgrounds (Aka 2002, p.254); lessons 
which an advanced civic education should have taught the people.  
By initiating negotiations with Amadou Ahidjo, the leader of La 
Republique du Cameroun, for the constitution without seeking any technical 
advice and without, until late, having to consult the opposition which had an 
equal number of seats in the West Cameroon state house of assembly and 
some of the most experienced and enlightened political leaders in the 
territory, the Southern Cameroons Premier became too presumptuous and 
arrogated to himself a responsibility far beyond his capacity. Even when the 
Chief Secretary to the Governor General of Nigeria and the Council of 
Ministers, Sir Foley Alfred Newns warned that based on its composition, the 
Southern Cameroons government was incapable of grappling with the 
tremendous problems which faced it as a result of their limited education, 
and proposed that it should be accompanied to the constitutional talks by 
British experts the Premier declared that ‘the drawing of this constitution is a 
matter for Cameroonians themselves, and it was no longer necessary to refer 
the matter to outsiders’ (Milne, 1999, p.435). On the contrary, even a much 
more politically experienced delegation from   La Republique du Cameroon 
(Mukete 2013, pp.501-521; Ngoh, 1987, p.139; Delancey, Mbuh and 
Delancey, 2010) did not deprive itself of the continuous presence of French 
technical advisers. 
In fact, the attitude that the Southern Cameroons leadership displayed in 
the events surrounding the drafting of the federal constitution could best be 
described as a display of immaturity.  They failed to be equipped with the 
necessary understanding and appreciation of the stakes of the matter because 
of a glaring lack of political education acquired as one acquires advanced 
education (Meyers, 2011; Hillygus, 2005; Galton, 2001; Nie, Junn and 
Stehlik-Berry, 1995). Also, by Platonic suppositions, the highest educational 
attainment is one of the most important criteria for political office and in 
drawing up the Nigerian Civil Service Code, it was understood that an 
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individual will contribute more effectively to the development of his society 
if he is allowed to perform the role commensurate to the educational level he 
had acquired. Applied in the state of West Cameroon, the code required that 
a degree from a recognized university was necessary for direct entry into the 
senior service and a university diploma from a post-secondary institution 
was necessary for entry into the intermediate level of administration. While 
this was strictly observed in Nigeria both in the holding of political and 
administrative office, it was not observed in the Cameroons due to the 
unavailability of highly educated indigenes.  
In the majority, the local educated elite in the Southern Cameroons was 
drawn from the elementary teacher training centres which had for long 
served as the major avenue for post-primary education provided by the 
administering authorities. Of the twenty-six members of the House of 
Assembly in West Cameroons in 1961, there was only one with some 
university education. There was one reverend pastor with some twelve to 
fourteen years of education, mainly in theology. The rest of the members 
were primary or secondary school graduates and dropouts (Mukete, 2013, 
pp.501-525). The same characteristics were exhibited by the Council of 
Ministers, made up of 96% elementary school teachers; only two of whom 
had obtained the Grade I certificate. John Ngu Foncha, the KNDP leader and 
Prime Minister, was a Grade II Teacher. In all, no member of his cabinet had 
had more than 14 years of formal education (Aka, 2002).  
In essence, as of 1961, the circle of the social class which formed the 
political leadership in the Southern Cameroons was very narrow; a limitation 
which was not caused by the inability and absence of potentials in the 
individual leaders to pursue higher education but by the unavailability of 
opportunities for further studies. It was a contradiction that while 
universities served as avenues for political education and nurseries for 
political leaders in the other British West African Dependencies, in the 
British Southern Cameroons it was the elementary teacher training colleges 
which remained the incubators of political leadership and the teaching 
profession as a whole (in the majority was elementary), the reservoir of the 
most enlightened political personnel. It is true that in Nigeria, and Ghana, 
teachers constituted the largest single group among members of parliament 
(Kalu, 1960, p.135) but it was not the elementary school teachers that played 
the front roles as it was the case in British Southern Cameroons. 
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In 1958, the United Nations Trusteeship Council (UN-TC) had forecasted 
that ‘the past inadequacy of educational facilities, would bear negatively on 
the rate of Cameroonization of the political leadership and in terms of 
development, would place the Southern Cameroons more than half a century 
behind Nigeria and other British West African territories (Trusteeship 
Council Doc. T/1426, 1958, p.11). On the eve of the 1959 elections in the 
Southern Cameroons, it had been forecasted that “it might be a tragedy for 
the territory if the KNDP won the elections, since (at that time), it was 
difficult to see people in the party with a reasonable level of education 
capable of taking up leadership positions” (Ardener, 1961, p.878). The 
KNDP actually won the elections. By 1972, the point had been driven home; 
political, administrative and managerial blunders, economic difficulties in 
the state of West Cameroon, the dissolution of the Federal system and the 
marginalization of the Southern/West Cameroon dubbed “a-little-knowing 
junior partner” (Ndi, 2016, p.176) by the majority former French Cameroons 
led government.  
Apart from the weaknesses displayed in the Pre-1961 constitutional 
negotiations, other consequences of trusting the destiny of the territory into 
the hand of leaders with a limited education were that knowledge of the 
socio-economic potentials of the territory were unknown to them. First, the 
contribution of the Southern Cameroons to the economic development of 
Nigeria and African history and civilization in general remained little known 
to the leadership as it was not part of the curriculum of primary and teacher 
training institutions.  Second, only a negligible number of the leadership had 
some faint knowledge about the Mandate and Trusteeship systems of 
colonial administration, especially about the differences between British and 
French systems of colonial rule, and the similarities if any in the two 
systems, and above all, the rights of colonial subjects and the responsibilities 
of administering powers (Aka, 2002) all of which would have informed their 
policies and decisions. 
Consequently, the political future of the territory was being shaped more 
on emotional and sentimental grounds guided by the slogans such as “how 
nice it will be to meet our brothers” than on any rational appreciation of 
economic, geographic or historical facts. According to Aka (2002, p.257) the 
Southern Cameroons political leaders were carried too far by the euphoria of 
reunification that they signed a blank cheque, merely trusting that the future 
development of policies would be guided by mutual compromise. He terms 
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their failure to master the issues objectively a matter of “throwing the future 
into a lake without knowing whether the lake was inhabited by fish or 
crocodiles.”  
Besides the above, other exhibitions of the effects of a limited political 
education on the part of the Southern Cameroons leadership at the Foumban 
constitutional talks could be seen in their failure to come up with a 
discussion on a specified formula of revenue allocation between the Federal 
and State governments to enable them execute their constitutional functions 
effectively; this being the most important requirement for federalism 
(Johnson 1970, p.219). Amadou Ahidjo; president of the Federal Republic 
and the leader of the delegation of La Republique du Cameroun probably 
aware of this quickly placed all viable sectors from which the West 
Cameroon government would have derived revenue like the ports under the 
federal government. This permanently put the West Cameroon state 
government at a deficit and at the mercy of federal subventions; a strong 
argument for West Cameroon financial insolvency which Ahidjo used to 
dismantle the federal system in 1972. Without financial autonomy, the state 
of West Cameroon therefore became only “an imagined space of freedom 
and identity” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, p.14). 
It has also been revealed that the Foumban constitutional talks were 
characterised not only by merry making and side attractions but by tension, 
mudslinging and the absence of consultation on the part of the Southern 
Cameroons delegation to the point where further negotiations like the 
August 1961 Yaoundé Tripartite Conference did not include the opposition 
in West Cameroon (Mbile 1999, pp165-195). Ngoh also shows how the 
‘Southern Cameroon Premier imagined the unimaginable in his 
constitutional proposals for a federal Cameroon’ by insisting that “the 
Southern Cameroons Governor would be a head of state, and the President 
of the Federal government would be a head of state, the Governor of the 
Republic of Cameroon would be a head of state” (Ngoh 2011, p.30). These 
pronouncements were also exhibitions of a limited grasp of the basic forms 
of government and their power atrributions. 
One can therefore say with certainty that amongst the combination of 
factors that account for the fate of the former Southern Cameroons after 
1961, the education factor cannot be left out. Until 1961, higher education 
was non-existent in the territory and its attainment was limited to a few 
government scholarships for studies in Nigeria and Britain. With the 
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consequence that very few university graduates were available to lead the 
territory through its most challenging days. There were also four under-
utilized Mission secondary schools. Like higher education, Britain didn’t 
open a government secondary school in the territory in her over 45 years of 
administration of the Cameroons. Consequently, it is the colonial education 
system and the administering authorities that are being faulted for the limited 
political education amongst the Southern Cameroons leadership which 
account for their dismal performance in the political as well as the economic 
sphere and the underdevelopment of the territory. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is not enough to argue that the founding fathers of Southern Cameroons 
nationalism did not restructure inherited colonial structures to make them 
profitable for the people. The difficult question is, how did the colonial 
system prepare them for the huge challenges they were expected to shoulder 
at independence? In this paper, I have argued that a significant level of 
education which affords aspiring leaders the competence of grasping 
complex socio-political, economic and cultural concepts is necessary for the 
effectiveness and efficiency of any government. With it they acquire 
foresight, knowledge, diplomatic, administrative and managerial skills which 
enable them to set policy agendas and pursue them rationally.   
In discussing the problem of limited education in the Southern 
Cameroons in 1955, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) had hammered on the fact that “no other type of 
investment will produce a greater return than an investment in higher 
education” (IBRD, 1955, p.372).  This reiterated more than downplayed the 
role that human resources with the necessary level of education can 
constitute as the ultimate basis for the wealth of nations (Harbison, 1973). 
Consequently a government that is unable to develop the skills and 
knowledge of its people to the maximum standards available in comparative 
terms and utilize them effectively in the national economy and politics, has 
not done any justice to the people. Any observable developmental deficit in 
the state of West Cameroon such as demonstrated in this paper, cannot 
therefore be separated from the leadership’s inability to play its role -a major 
factor being its limited educational attainment resulting from the colonial 
educational inadequacies.  
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While the study has used the years 1959 and 1972 to establish the impact 
of the colonial education and manpower nexus in the Cameroons, it is 
important to state that the phenomenon was not limited exclusively to the 
KNDP government which was in power for a majority of these years. Even 
Endeley’s government (1954-59); the first indigenous government of the 
Southern Cameroons, was not healthier in its composition and would not 
have done better. Asked why higher education so cherished by the people 
was at the same time so limited, one cannot help but conclude that a weak 
colonial education structure guaranteed continuous internal control of the 
territory. It was clear that through a weak educational system, the African 
nationalists who masterminded the wind of change in the late 1950s would 
fail to create stable postcolonial nation states and thus remain dependent on 
the metropole. Going by the Decolonial hypothesis, poor and skewed social 
bases of imagination as well as a weak and fragile African nationalism 
giving birth to underdevelopment and dependence had long been the hidden 
agenda for a limited education.  
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